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Essay
Finding the Error in Daubert
Mark Haug and Emily Baird
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. laid down the
standard for admissibility of expert testimony. We believe the best standard is simpler
than the one chosen by the Court: The Daubert standard really is about discerning the
trustworthiness of expert, and trustworthiness is best determined through an expert’s
accounting of the error within his testimony. Lower courts have struggled with the
Daubert standard. We offer evidence of the problem and propose a new standard that
would capture the essence of Daubert but significantly simplify its application.

 Ph.D., J.D., School of Business Teaching Fellow at the University of Kansas. We wish to
thank Lauren Moreno for her suggestions and the editorial staff at Hastings Law Journal for their time
and assistance in editing our paper.
 Masters in Professional Accounting Candidate, The University of Texas at Austin.
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Introduction
In federal courts, expert evidence enjoys two freedoms other
1
evidence does not: permissible hearsay and opinion testimony.
2
Accordingly, the rule for admissibility of expert testimony has a
significant impact on litigation. Many high-stakes cases turn on “the
battle of the experts,” engaging counsel and judges alike to apply the
Daubert standard. We believe this standard is difficult to apply. Our
Essay proposes a new standard that simply examines the three types of
error that exist in the scientific endeavor. Such a bold proposal as ours,
of course, requires a credible argument as to why current thinking is
flawed and examining the past and present struggles with admitting
expert opinion.
3
Our proposal is consistent with Daubert’s motivation and Federal
4
Rule of Evidence 702. In our belief, it is also more faithful to Federal
5
6
7
8
Rule of Evidence 403, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Amendments, and

1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Unlike an ordinary witness,
an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand
knowledge or observation. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand
knowledge—a rule which represents ‘a most pervasive manifestation of the common law insistence
upon ‘the most reliable sources of information.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 602
advisory committee’s note) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen.
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. 509 U.S. 579.
4. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
5. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
6. U.S. Const. amend. V.
7. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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promotes expedient litigation. We propose the following rule:
If an expert can account for the measurement error, the random error,
and the systematic error in his evidence, then he ought to be permitted
to testify. On the other hand, if he should fail to account for any one or
more of these three types of error, then his testimony ought not be
admitted.

Our rule simply asks an expert for an accounting of error in his
evidence, which, of course, is the primary interest in adjudicating opinion
9
testimony. If an expert cannot account for each of science’s three errors,
then it is self-evident that the expert himself is uncertain as to the degree
of credibility that ought to be placed upon his opinion. A jurist ought to
bar the expert from testifying, as the expert is either not an able expert
or his testimony is no longer grounded in expert judgment but has
crossed into speculation. If on the other hand, the expert can account for
all three errors, then his opinion contains an objective degree of
credibility. The expert’s opinion, accounting for all three kinds of error,
10
ought to be the subject of “vigorous cross-examination,” because his
opinion would provide a common and scientifically acceptable basis and
could therefore either be rebutted based on the facts of the case, or
challenged as an expert opinion.
To explain our proposal, we begin with a short review of Daubert
11
and its progeny. In our review, we consider some of the ways courts
12
have managed the four nonexclusive criteria promulgated in Daubert
13
for the purpose of assessing evidentiary reliability and, ultimately,
14
admissibility. We consider data which provide a look at how these
criteria have been implemented in the lower courts. Following this, we
provide a taxonomy of error: an explanation and illustration of three
types of error in science. In our conclusion, we show how our proposal
15
satisfies all four criteria, is more expedient, and is more manageable for
16
the gatekeeper.

8. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
9. See infra Part III; see also Mark Haug, Minimizing Uncertainty in Scientific Evidence, in
Scientific Evidence Review: Monograph No.7, at 87, 88–89 (Cynthia H. Cwik & Helen E. Witt eds.,
2006).
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
11. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997).
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
13. Id. at 590.
14. Id. at 592.
15. “Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve
disputes finally and quickly.” Id. at 597.
16. See generally Tal Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific
Expert Testimony in England and America (2004) (examining the past and present struggles with
admitting expert opinion).
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I. DAUBERT’s Four Factors to Assess Evidentiary Reliability
The Court in Daubert set out to determine whether the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded the rule for admissibility of expert opinion
17
18
established in Frye v. United States seventy years earlier. Daubert
19
alleged that Merrell Dow’s medication, Bendectin, caused birth defects.
20
Applying the Frye standard of general acceptance, the lower courts had
determined that it was not generally accepted that Bendectin caused
21
birth defects. Daubert argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence,
however, suggested a more expansive view of admissibility of expert
22
23
opinion than Frye. The Court agreed.
The Court in Daubert proposed the following criteria for
determining the admissibility of expert opinion under the Federal Rules
24
25
26
of Evidence: testability, peer review, known or potential rate of error,
27
and general acceptance. Although much has been written concerning
Daubert, we find no conclusive material on Daubert’s factor of “known
28
or potential error rate.” Three possible reasons include: (1) it is difficult
to define, but “we know it when we see it”; (2) it is merely a detail of
“evidentiary reliability” and therefore, does not warrant such attention;
or, (3) it is too difficult to implement.
Whatever the reasons may be, this factor is worthy of consideration,
at the very least, to alert the unsuspecting jurist of the perils of error
identification and quantification. Our purpose, however, is far bolder:
We believe that within this factor lies the crux of admitting opinion
testimony. Whether for the minimal purpose of illuminating a mere
factor or for the grander purpose of a new rule of admissibility, our

17. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585–87.
19. Id. at 582.
20. “General Acceptance” refers to the methods, practices, and body of knowledge generally
accepted within the scientific discipline under consideration. See id. at 584.
21. Id. at 583–85 (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
22. Id. at 587–89.
23. Id. at 587.
24. Id. at 593 (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested.”).
25. Id. at 593–94 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication. . . . [S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community
is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected.”).
26. Id. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily
should consider the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation.” (citation omitted)).
27. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. . . . ‘[A] known
technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community’ may properly be
viewed with skepticism.” (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985))).
28. Id. at 580.
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objective is to enable legal professionals to use sound judgment with
respect to scientific error and thereby provide greater clarity and
predictability to Daubert hearings. In pursuit of our objective, we
endeavor to convince the reader that Daubert’s list of four nonexclusive
29
factors, as well as any other factor illuminating evidentiary reliability of
scientific evidence, may be subsumed into an able analysis of error.
We begin with our belief that the United States Supreme Court did
not know exactly what to do with the “known or potential rate of error”
factor. For example, the Court provides imprecise support for its
decision. In footnote 9, the Court supplies, in part, “the difference
between accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is
30
distinct from the other by no more than a hen’s kick.” Indeed, the Court
31
has technically mislabeled this factor. Superficially, the factor is
seemingly well designed, with a strong whiff of the “stuff” of science. The
general acceptance factor, the peer review factor, and the testability
factor are all qualitative judgments, while the “error” factor is seemingly
an invitation for some quantitative—and therefore difficult—indicia. The
“error” factor invites a number of variations laid upon the “gatekeeper,”
such as: Must the error rate be known with exactitude (rather than
32
potential)? Shall the error rate be held to some predetermined standard
29. Id. at 593–94.
30. Id. at 590 n.9 (quoting James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As we have set out to show in this Essay, the issues of “accuracy,” “validity,” and
“reliability” are independent topics and are quite different in their diagnosis and prognosis.
31. The Court’s persistence with the term “rate of error” is a hint that the Court is uncertain what
to do with the idea of error: For all of the Court’s careful and precise thought, its use of the term
“rate” is either grossly misplaced or contemplates something that needs further description. The term
“rate” refers to a ratio with some quantity per unit of time. See, e.g., Regina C. Elandt-Johnson,
Definition of Rates, 102 Am. J. Epidemiology, 267, 268 (1975). Scientific errors, however, are generally
understood as proportions—a quantity where the numerator is contained in the denominator. Id.
32. See, e.g., Sorto-Romero v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 05-CV-5172 (SJF) (AKT), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71588, at *22–23 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (finding that plaintiff’s proferred engineering
expert, who would testify that the wood-carving tool that caused injury was defective, was unreliable
for reasons including that an error rate could not be produced); Rabozzi v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 5:03CV-1397 (NAM/DEP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21724, at *7, *8, *20 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (finding
a civil engineering expert’s testimony regarding a jet boat design to be inadmissible, as none of the
four Daubert criteria were met, including that the expert did not provide a known rate of error);
Roane v. Greenwich Swim Comm., 330 F. Supp. 2d 306, 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that the
proffered expert in the field of mechanical engineering was precluded from testifying, in part due to
the inability to produce a rate of error); Nook v. Long Island R.R. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 639, 641–42
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting motion to exclude plaintiff-employee’s expert testimony from an industrial
hygienist on the grounds that the expert did not uphold the Daubert standards and could not offer a
known rate of error); United States v. Towns, 19 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70–72 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing but
limiting the testimony of a clinical psychology expert regarding defendant’s mens rea and his claim of
mental illness being the cause of his attempted bank robbery, because the proffer asserted that an
error rate would be provided by said expert). Similarly, in Phillips v. Raymond Corp., defendants
moved to exclude the plaintiff’s expert in the field of biomechanics. 364 F. Supp. 2d 730, 732–33 (N.D.
Ill. 2005). The court granted the motion, finding that the expert had not reliably tested his assertions,
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33

among scientists or jurists? Is it sufficient that the expert can calculate
34
the known or potential rate of error? Is it sufficient that the gatekeeper
35
can assess the known or potential rate of error? The factor invites other

because the error rate was referenced as being unknown; in order to have provided an accurate error
rate, the expert would have had to use “retrospective analysis,” which he did not do. Id. at 740–41.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Microtek Int’l Dev. Sys. Div., Inc., No. 99-298-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2771, at *2, *10–13, *15 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 2000) (excluding data from polygraph test because the
error rate was referenced as being low in highly controlled studies, but when applied in the “real
world,” was generally much higher, and because data showed that, on average, false negatives
occurred 5% of the time and false positives, 10% of the time); Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F.
Supp. 547, 556–57 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (allowing the testimony of an expert offered to provide a
comparative test studying the engine of a Sea Doo in choppy water, but limiting the testimony to that
of a lay person, rather than an expert, because the test performed was found to be unreliable, partially
due to a high estimated rate of error). Another example is In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation,
393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), which consolidated numerous civil actions claiming that the
consumption of dietary supplements containing Ephedra resulted in injury or death. The defendants
moved to exclude expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs. Id. P-values and confidence intervals
were identified as the two ways that epidemiological studies are statistically evaluated. Id. at 191. The
experts’ study offered that “the fivefold increased rate of hemorrhagic stroke among study participants
who took more than 32 mg of ephedra on the day before the case’s stroke has a ‘95% confidence
interval of 0.84 to 41.33.’” Id. The statistical significance of the study was therefore found to be
insufficient, as that “interval includes the value 1.0 (which would mean no increased risk).” Id. The
referenced p-value was .07, which would assume a “less than a one-in-14 chance of [an association
between ephedra and stroke] being due to a sampling error.” Id. at 191 n.7.
34. See, e.g., Albert v. Jordan, Nos. 05CV516, 05CV517, 05CV518, 05CV519, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92025, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Dec. 14, 2007) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the testimony of
an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation, while also finding that the expert provided reliable
information, and noting that the rate of error was known without further addressing it); Benkwith v.
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1326, 1330, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (granting defendant’s
motion to exclude testimony of an expert in the field of epidemiology regarding a spray causing
plaintiff’s anosmia, because the opinions had not been tested and a rate of error could not be
provided).
35. For example, in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eight Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to allow testimony of a regression analyst commissioned by
plaintiffs’ Native American voters in order to show that the redistricting of the legislative area caused
a bloc in the Native American vote. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Gruender notes some
discomfort with the testimony due to Daubert’s known or potential rate of error factor, explaining that
it is “difficult to weigh this factor in Daubert’s analysis if ‘the effect of that error is unknown.’” Id. at
1026 (Gruender, J., concurring) (quoting Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1002 (D.S.D.
2004)). For other examples, see e.g., United States v. Leblanc, 45 F. App’x 393, 398, 400 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding evidence was inadmissible when plaintiff sought to introduce testimony of a child psychologist
regarding the susceptibility of children to coercive interrogation in a case of sexual assault, because the
opinion relied on “‘soft science’ . . . in which ‘error is . . . rampant’” (quoting the district court));
United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698–99 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (admitting expert’s testimony
on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony in a Daubert hearing, and finding that the factor of error
rate was not relevant as the study in question relied on the accuracy of observations made by other
people based on the order in which photographs were placed); Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co., No. 84-3483
(NHJ), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21318, at *16, *22–24 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1995) (finding that plaintiff’s
teratology expert was not permitted to testify, because the methodology used was found to be
unreliable and could not yield an accurate error rate). Similarly, in Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., where
plaintiffs filed suit against a drug manufacturer after their son committed suicide shortly after taking a
drug prescribed to treat depression, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling rejecting plaintiff’s
expert—whose opinion would have provided evidence correlating the suicide and drug consumption.
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36

combinations of these questions as well. The Court’s language simply
provides:
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
37
operation.

With such minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower court on
remand found two of the four factors—one being the rate of error—
38
”difficult or impossible to apply to the expert testimony in th[e] case.”
More recently, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended, inter
alia, to reflect the Court’s reasoning in Daubert and its progeny,
including Joiner and Kumho Tire:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or

356 F.3d 1326, 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2004). Concerning the rate of error, the court held that the test
lacked sufficient sample size, controls, and interaction with study participants to be based on sound
facts. Id. As a final example, the plaintiff in Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Duboi U.K., Ltd., a
developer of fanjet engines, sued the defendant, a designer, for breach of contract over a piece of
engine the defendant designed, which plaintiff claimed was “worthless.” 326 F.3d 1333, 1343–45 (11th
Cir. 2003). The court found that a defense expert in the field of aerospace engineering, proffered to
provide support that the piece worked as described, was properly admitted. Id. The court also found
the error rate to be “relatively low.” Id. Plaintiff argued that the expert had entered data incorrectly,
but the court held that the mistake would not affect the validity of the evidence. Id.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 427–28, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding
the decision to admit testimony of a forensic chemist expert, because although she could not identify
an error rate, reviews of her work found it to be error-free); United States v. Vitek Supply Corp.,
144 F.3d 476, 480, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the rate of error was accounted for in the test’s
control over false positives and false negatives in plaintiffs’ proffered scientific evidence, showing the
presence of a known carcinogen in defendant’s livestock feed used to reduce fat in animals); United
States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444, 1446–48 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that DNA evidence was
properly admitted, as it was tested, reviewed, and accepted by the scientific community, and in regards
to the error rate, finding that the test had followed acceptable standards and, therefore, the accuracy
of the test was statistically significant); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1148, 1152, 1154–55
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that although the rate of error was not quantified, there was a sufficient
showing in support of a low error rate to allow expert testimony matching the defendant’s DNA with
that found on the body of a sexual abuse victim, and noting, specifically, the minimal existence of false
positives); Wright v. Case Corp., No. 1:03-CV-1618-JEC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7683, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
Feb. 1, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s mechanical engineering expert,
because the expert’s alternative designs for the seat safety bar were not reliable due to potential
feasibility issues, and because the associated error rate was therefore unquantifiable but potentially
very high).
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omitted).
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995). On remand, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the plaintiff’s experts, providing opinions that a
prescription drug taken during pregnancy caused birth defects in infants, were inadmissible, leading to
a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1322. In applying the Daubert factors, the court
found that interpretation of the third factor—rate of error—was particularly difficult, primarily
because two of the three experts did not actually test their theories, making an error rate impossible to
define. Id. at 1317 n.4.
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otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
39
facts of the case.

This second attempt at the complex business of codifying the
Federal Rules of Evidence to allow opinion testimony suggests at least
two things: first, that the language of Rule 702 needs to be redrafted to
use clearer language and to be more consistent with existing authority;
and second, that the prevailing four factors of Daubert are insufficient for
40
guiding determinations of admissibility. Nevertheless, the Daubert
factors continue to assert a powerful force in the admissibility of expert
evidence.

II. Error in the Courts
In Part II, we empirically review how courts have handled the
41
“known or potential rate of error” (“KPRE”) factor at trial and on
appeal. To generally understand how the courts have managed the
KPRE factor, we collected all federal trial and federal appellate cases
prior to October 2008 that satisfied the criteria of citing Daubert and,
specifically, using either the term “error rate” (“ER”) or “known or
42
potential rate of error.”
A. Trial Court Results
Our research produced 1585 trial cases with several thousand
experts. Using stratified random sampling with different circuits as the
43
strata, we identified 107 trial cases for our research. Taken together,
44
these cases provided 200 experts who were challenged for admissibility.

39. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
40. See Fed R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note.
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
42. The search concluded in October 2008. To develop a dataset of cases from which we could
draw a sample, we used the LexisNexis online database. Our search was repeated three times per
circuit: First by a key term search of “known or potential rate of error,” then by a key term search of
“error rate,” then by both “known or potential rate of error” and “error rate” (to identify any cases
using both phrases and, therefore, listed twice within the collected results).
43. Although stratified sampling ordinarily is designed to balance the sample—in other words, to
achieve a constant proportion—across each stratum, our method was primarily designed to avoid lack
of representation in any one of the circuit courts of appeal. See Gary L. Tietjen, A Topical
Dictionary of Statistics 145 (1986).
44. See infra Table 1.
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Table 1: Trial Cases by Circuits That
45
Cite DAUBERT and Refer to ER or KPRE
Federal
Circuit

Identified

1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
DC
Total

58
190
189
68
196
140
172
123
135
150
148
16
1585

Stratified
Random
Sampling
4
12
12
4
12
9
11
8
8
9
9
9
107

At the trial court level, we examined several elements, including the
46
frequency with which experts were scrutinized under each factor and
47
the frequency that the expert was admitted. For example, only 33 of 200
randomly selected experts were analyzed on KPRE, and none of those 33
experts were analyzed on KPRE alone. Not surprisingly, KPRE was the
factor considered least among the four. Although the random sample
size is insufficient to identify a significant difference in admit proportions
among the four factors, KPRE exhibits the second lowest admit
proportion. This suggests that perhaps it may be a factor of “last” resort
when trial courts prepare their support for not admitting an expert.

45. Note that 107 cases produced 200 experts.
46. We required that the factor be applied to the context of the case. If a factor was mentioned
within a case in regards only to a discussion of Daubert, rather than in application to the case, we
regarded the factor as unaddressed.
47. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Trial Cases Involving the Admissibility of
48
Experts Classified by Factor
KPRE

Testability

Peer Review
(PR)

General
Acceptance
(GA)

Total

Only
KPRE

With
Other
Factors

Only
Testability

With
Other
Factors

Only
PR

With
Other
Factors

Only
GA

With
Other
Factors

Number

0

33

82

69

3

44

5

49

200

Admit

0

16

53

37

2

19

5

26

130

Admit
Proportion

N/A

0.48

0.65

0.54

0.67

0.43

1.00

0.53

0.65

95% CI for
Admit
Proportion

N/A

0.31–
0.66

0.54–
0.75

0.42–
0.65

0.10–
1.00

0.29–
0.58

0.56–
1.00

0.39–
0.67

0.58–
0.72

Not surprisingly, testability is a favored factor, probably because it is
grounded in principles other than science and can be affirmatively
demonstrated by simply providing an explanation of how a theory may
49
be tested and, by extension, rejected. General acceptance requires more
subjectivity as experts may reasonably disagree as to what is generally
accepted within their fields. General acceptance also has problems
standing on its own due to the Court’s setting it aside in Frye as a lone
50
factor. General acceptance, however, has enjoyed the position of sole
51
criterion on admissibility for seventy years, and it is not surprising to see
its prevalence in many of the decisions. Peer review is more difficult to
assess and thus, less frequently analyzed on its own. This is probably due
to the fact that adequate peer review falls squarely within the prevailing
culture of science, a realm which the gatekeeper may avoid in favor of
more accessible factors. Nevertheless, the data suggest peer review is an
easier factor to assess than error.
Also significant in Table 2 is the admissibility frequency: When
multiple factors are considered, the likelihood of admission decreases in
all cases. We believe that these data suggest, even if only slightly, that
trial courts’ presumption is toward admission. When admission is
rejected, the courts are more careful to provide additional bases. One
52
53
thing is certain: The covariate of the factor is essential to the analysis.

48. Note that the totals do not add across the rows because of double counting in columns 3, 5, 7,
and 9.
49. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citing Karl Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
50. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
52. A covariate is a relevant but often missing variable in an analysis. Judea Pearl, Causality 78
(2000). In this case, when the specific factor is present in Table 2, the effect is evident. When the effect
is obscured through aggregation of the data in Table 3, the effect vanishes. A fine example of a missing
covariate is provided in David H. Kaye & David A Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
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When ignoring the covariate of factor, the effect essentially vanishes.
Note the admit proportion is 64% when ignoring specific factors but
becomes 48%, 54%, 43%, and 53%, respectively, when considered by
54
factor. This is an example of a pseudo-Simpson’s Paradox.

Table 3: Trial Cases Involving the Admissibility of Experts
Classified by Single Factor and Multiple Factors

Number
Admit
Proportion

Single
Factor Only
90
60
0.67

Multiple
Factors
110
70
0.64

Total
200
130
0.65

Concerning the covariate of the factor, we considered whether each
factor was a significant predictor of admissibility. Using the entire
random sample of 200 experts, we created a simple two-by-two
55
contingency table for each factor. One variable was whether the factor
was considered or not in the decision whether to admit the expert. The
56
second variable was whether the expert was admitted or not. It is
evident from the p-values that all factors were associated with the
decision to admit except for general acceptance, which was not
57
statistically significantly linked. More specifically, when the statistically
significant factors were considered, admit proportions dropped.
58
59
60
Whenever KPRE, peer review or testability were analyzed, apart or
together, there was a statistically significant drop in the likelihood of
admission when compared to all other cases.

Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 83, 108–10 & n.10 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 2d ed. 2000), in
which the missing covariate is the college attended by the people in the sample.
53. See infra Table 3.
54. Simpson’s Paradox concerns the contradictory result that occasionally occurs when a
covariate is missing. Pearl, supra note 52. A fine example of a Simpson’s Paradox is evident within the
missing covariate example provided in Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 108–10.
55. See generally David J. Sheskin, Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical
Procedures 209–11 (1997) (discussing rXc contingency tables).
56. See infra Tables 4, 5, 6, & 7.
57. See infra Table 7.
58. See infra Table 4.
59. See infra Table 5.
60. See infra Table 6.
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Table 4: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by
61
Consideration of KPRE

Admit
NOT Admit
Total
Proportion

Court Did
Consider
KPRE
16
17
33
0.48

Court Did
NOT Consider
KPRE
114
53
167
0.68

Total
130
70
200
0.65

Table 5: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by
62
Consideration of PR

Admit
NOT Admit
Total
Proportion

Court Did
Consider
PR
21
26
47
0.45

Court Did
NOT Consider
PR
109
44
153
0.71

Total
130
70
200
0.65

Table 6: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by
63
Consideration of Testability

Admit
NOT Admit
Total
Proportion

Court Did
Consider
Testability
90
61
151
0.60

Court Did
NOT Consider
Testability
40
9
49
0.82

Total
130
70
200
0.65

Table 7: Cross-Tabulation of Experts by Admission and by
64
Consideration of GA

Admit
NOT Admit
Total
Proportion

61.
62.
63.
64.

Court Did
Consider
GA
31
23
54
0.57

Chi Square = 4.74, p ≈ 0.0295.
Chi Square = 11.15, p ≈ 0.0008.
Chi Square = 7.89, p ≈ 0.0050.
Chi Square = 1.87, p ≈ 0.1710.

Court Did
NOT Consider
GA
99
47
146
0.68

Total
130
70
200
0.65
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Taken together, our findings from the randomly selected trial cases
suggest that trial courts tend to avoid KPRE (and to a lesser degree, peer
review). Whenever trial courts considered these two factors, they tended
to use the factors to support their decisions not to admit the expert.
B. Appellate Court Results
Applying the same search criteria used to identify trial cases, we
identified 337 experts considered in 271 appellate cases satisfying our
search criteria. These data are a complete census of our findings at the
appellate level, unlike the trial cases in which the large numbers of
65
identified cases and experts necessitated sampling. At the appellate
level, we were primarily interested in whether trial decisions were
reversed or not and whether the appellate court identified KPRE in its
reasoning.
Table 8: Experts Identified in Appellate Cases:
Cases That Refer to ER or KPRE
Fed
Circuit

Experts
Identified

1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
DC
Totals

12
11
19
22
36
32
25
33
52
46
40
9
337

Number of Experts
or Judges that
Directly Addressed
ER or KPRE
3
0
3
3
1
2
2
9
11
2
4
1
41

Proportion of
Experts or Judges
Directly Addressing
ER or KPRE
0.25
0.00
0.16
0.14
0.03
0.06
0.08
0.27
0.21
0.04
0.10
0.11
0.12

Reversals
1
1
6
0
12
5
7
11
10
4
8
3
68

Reversals with
ER or KPRE
Addressed in
the Opinion
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
5

Evident from Tables 9 and 10 below is the finding that reversals
drop when ER or KPRE is directly addressed in the lower court.
Although not persuasive standing alone, it is additional evidence that the
KPRE factor may be troublesome. When appellate courts review cases
that directly address the KPRE factor for experts not admitted, the
reversals drop from 15% to 11% (p = 0.28). Similarly, when appellate
courts review cases that directly address the KPRE factor for experts
admitted, the reversals drop from 25% to 14% (p = 0.08). These results,
taken together, could indicate one of at least two things about the
appellate courts: (1) they are less comfortable with the substantive issues
of KPRE and thus more deferential, but nevertheless feel compelled to

65. See infra Table 8.
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consider it as a matter of law, or (2) they find that the substantive issues
of KPRE provide an improved measure of objectivity in the gatekeeper’s
decision and, accordingly, are more deferential. In either case, these data
and inferences support the idea that the KPRE factor would benefit from
a carefully constructed definition that would be easy to implement but
nevertheless confer objectivity upon the decision to admit expert evidence.
Table 9: Experts (n = 337) Within Appellate Cases
66
That Refer to ER or KPRE
Proportion
Reversed

Reversed
Admitted

N
Y

N
141
128

Y
25
43

0.15
0.25

Table 10: Experts (n = 41) Within Appellate Cases:
67
Experts or Judges That Directly Address ER or KPRE
Proportion
Reversed

Reversed
Admitted

N
Y

N
17
19

Y
2
3

0.11
0.14

C. Summary of Results
Our empirical analyses confirm our hypothesis: Daubert is difficult
to implement. More specifically, the nonexclusive factor of KPRE is
especially problematic. Its prevalence among the four enumerated
factors is the lowest. In fact, within a relatively large representative
sample of cases, we never found it to be the sole criterion for
admissibility. We did, however, find each of the other factors serving as
sole criterion in a number of cases. Whenever KPRE was applied in
conjunction with other factors, its application was inconsistent with
scientists’ concept of error.
In our analyses of appellate decisions, we found that only 12% of
the experts or judges in these decisions have directly dealt with KPRE.
Furthermore, when the appellate court reversed the trial court on the
admissibility of expert opinion—in 20% of the cases—the appellate court
relied on KPRE in only 7% of those reversals—the entirety of which (5
of 68) came from only two circuits. Our scientific training, together with
these data, leads us to believe that the KPRE factor ought to be the
essential factor of admissibility. As it is the most problematic, proper

66. Chi Square = 5.32, p ≈ 0.0211.
67. Chi Square = 0.09, p ≈ 0.7615.
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consideration of this factor demands attention.

III. A Taxonomy of Error
Most people can find some comfort in the quantification of error, if
for no other reason than that correct quantification provides objectivity.
68
Scientists and professionals regularly assert confidence intervals and p69
values to make their points. There is something satisfying in summarily
reducing the research into a simple decision rule that requires only
elementary math to appreciate. Confidence intervals and p-values,
70
however, only assess the random error evident in the research. Because
great learning and effort is undertaken by the scientist in creating this
summary—indeed this is one of the greatest parts of a scientist’s
training—there is something of an “endowment effect” on the process
71
and its findings. Researcher and reader alike come to appreciate the
effort, the learning, and the data, and are eager to engage this scientific
currency of p-values and confidence intervals to assess a scientific
72
endeavor’s value.
Data derived from scientific and professional inquiry entails three
specific types of error. These errors are known by other names, but are
most conveniently referred to as measurement error, random error, and
73
systematic error.
Table 11: Types of Uncertainty
Type of
Uncertainty
Measurement
Error
Random Error

Systematic Error

Synonyms

Antonyms

Measurement
Variation, Mistake,

Basic Cure in Most Cases
Proper Equipment and

Precision

Fraud

Proper Procedures Lead to
Greater Precision

Variation, Chance,

Reliability,

Larger Sample Sizes Lead to

Noise

Consistency

Greater Reliability

Systematic

Validity,

Variation, Bias

Accuracy

Random Sampling or
Randomization Enhances
Validity

68. Stacie Ezelle Taylor, Confidence Intervals, in 1 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology 225–27 (Sarah
Boslaugh ed., 2008).
69. Mark Gerald Haug, p-Value, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology 863–65 (Sarah Boslaugh
ed., 2008).
70. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 161, 168.
71. John R. Nofsinger, The Psychology of Investing 36 (2d ed. 2005).
72. The first Author, in his law practice, has witnessed this phenomena—summarily reducing
KPRE to a question of p-value or confidence interval—among other attorneys and judges in toxic tort
litigation and class actions, as well as in prominent Continuing Legal Education (CLE) venues.
73. See Rebecca Harrington & Li-Ching Lee, Type I and Type II Errors, in 2 Encyclopedia of
Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 1052, 1052–53; David L. McArthur, Measurement, in 2 Encyclopedia
of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 645, 645; Louise-Anne McNutt et al., Bias, in 1 Encyclopedia of
Epidemiology, supra note 68, at 77, 77.
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A. Measurement Error
Measurement error concerns the uncertainty in measuring a fixed
74
quantity. To measure a mile is a trivial task—a fixed quantity measured
out with whatever tool is handy. Note, though, that the tool may not be
perfectly measured out to exactly one mile. Also, the operator measuring
75
the mile may err in application of the tool. In a scientific endeavor
where the stakes may be sufficiently high—unlike the mile measurement
above—these potential measurement errors are controlled with sufficient
76
care relative to the theory studied and its implications.
B. Random Error
Random error concerns chance: the reality that uncertainty exists
77
due to matters beyond our perception. For example, the stock market
exhibits random error—if it did not, the efficient market naysayers would
seize upon every change and become extraordinarily wealthy. A more
mundane and illustrative example is the simple die. Its sole purpose is to
introduce random variation. Random error occurs when we reasonably
expect the “expected value” of 3.5, but never actually observe such a
78
value. More relevant to legal practice, random error is contemplated in
79
employment law’s theory of disparate impact, where a plaintiff’s prima
80
facie case may be made on a p-value of around 0.05. The p-value is
nothing more than a statement of random error.
C. Systematic Error
We believe that an expert’s account of systematic error is far more
important than that of random error. While both are important,
systematic error goes to the question of relevance: to what degree does
81
the research generalize to the person(s) in question? Random error
merely is an artifact of research protocol—namely, sample size: given

74. See McArthur, supra note 73, at 645–49.
75. Each of these concerns may be considered as sub-units of measurement error. Many scientific
disciplines have their own nomenclature, but in the end, these ideas are collectively measurement
error.
76. See Mark Haug & Mark Hirschey, The January Effect, 62 Fin. Analysts J., Sept./Oct. 2006, at
78, 79 (arguing that by examining small-cap stocks instead of more profitable trading opportunities,
the effect being studied is more likely a statistical oddity than compelling evidence of market
inefficiency).
77. See Harrington & Lee, supra note 73, at 1053 (“[W]e accept the probability of drawing
incorrect conclusions merely by chance.”).
78. See generally Deborah J. Bennett, Randomness (1998).
79. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (considering statistical evidence
of employment discrimination).
80. 1 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert
Testimony § 6:36, at 360 n.3, 362 (2008–2009 ed. 2008).
81. Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 160.
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that to which we can generalize, to what degree is the picture in focus?
We believe it unfortunate that footnote 9 ever found its way into
83
Daubert—as Starrs’s point cited therein is incorrect. Scientific reliability
is a question of random error, while scientific validity is a question of
84
systematic error.
Systematic error, more commonly known as bias, is a great fact of
85
the scientific endeavor. A large volume of litigation involves human
injury such as toxic torts, medical malpractice, and products liability. In
such matters, proximate cause is typically established with scientific
evidence demonstrating an association between the action complained of
86
and the plaintiff’s injury or damages. Unfortunately, such scientific
findings of association often do not enjoy the benefits of an experimental
87
protocol, but rather an observational protocol. For example, animal
studies are extremely useful in elevating human subject research from
observational to experimental—permitting random sampling and its
88
accompanying benefits. Criticism, however, often draws attention to the
differences between the animal and the human—the sole source of bias
in a well-designed animal study—while largely ignoring the many biases
89
attendant to the alternative.
The distinction between experimental (elements of random
90
91
or randomization ) and observational (no random
sampling
82. See generally Bennett, supra note 78.
83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (“[T]he difference between
accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a
hen’s kick.” (quoting James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal
to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 256 (1986))).
84. See McArthur, supra note 73.
85. See McNutt et al., supra note 73.
86. See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, supra note 52, at 333, 374 (“Once an association has been found between
exposure to an agent and development of a disease, researchers consider whether the association
reflects a true cause-effect relationship.”).
87. An experimental protocol contains some element of random sampling or randomization that
eliminates experimental bias beyond the point of the randomizing/random sampling. Id. at 391. For
example, clinical trials enjoy the benefits of an experimental protocol. See John J. Hsieh, Clinical
Trials, in 1 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at 201–02. An observational protocol has
no element of either randomization or random sampling. Green et al., supra note 86, at 394.
Accordingly, scientists must thoroughly consider their research designs to minimize biases to the
extent possible. See Craig Newschaffer, Observational Studies, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology,
supra note 69, at 757–60.
88. Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra note 52, at 405.
89. Id. at 413–14. David Sackett has catalogued thirty-five biases that may accompany the sort of
scientific studies that would be appropriate in the absence of animal studies. See generally David L.
Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. Chronic Diseases 51 (1979).
90. See Anthony Roman, Sampling Techniques, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note
69, at 935–38.
91. See Sydney Pettygrove, Randomization, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69,
at 891.

Haug_62-HLJ-221 (Do Not Delete)

754

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/4/2011 12:20 PM

[Vol. 62:737

component) derives from the same features that systematic error does.
For example, a toxicology study may use humans as it subjects. Of
course, there ought to be no random component—as that would
inevitably place someone in harm’s way against his wishes. Using an
92
observational study, for instance, a cohort study, we could track people
over time and study the relationship between those who were exposed to
the suspected agent and the suspected outcome(s). If a relationship
exists, we are wary of the relationship, as there may be other factors not
93
studied that are the true causes of the outcome. Random sampling and
randomization solves this problem by creating statistically equivalent
94
groups. Therefore, a scientist may prefer rats as subjects. When all is
said and done, rat studies enjoy the benefits and expediency of
experimental studies. Of course, there now remains a new source of
systematic bias: Rats are systematically different than humans. A proper
scientific analysis of either protocol would identify and enumerate the
sources of systematic error.

Conclusion
The idea of error summarily captures the whole of an expert’s
credibility. If evidence is without error, then we welcome it, except where
it may be unjust to do so. If evidence is with error—and that error can be
properly accounted for—then we would also welcome it as evidence,
except where it may be unjust to do so, as it would “assist the trier of fact
95
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Our
proposal is aimed toward this end:
If an expert can account for the measurement error, the random error,
and the systematic error in his evidence, then he ought to be permitted
to testify. On the other hand, if he should fail to account for any one or
more of these three types of error, then his testimony ought not be
admitted.

Our proposal satisfies all four criteria outlined in Daubert, is more
expedient than Daubert or Federal Rule of Evidence 702, is more
manageable to the gatekeeper, and will result in better decisions through
its reliance on objectivity. Where there is disagreement as to its elements,
“vigorous cross-examination” ensures better decisions.
Certainly an accounting of error more fully responds to KPRE than
does any other alternative—which usually entails an analysis of the

92. See Philip C. Nasca, Study Design, in 2 Encyclopedia of Epidemiology, supra note 69, at
1008, 1010–11.
93. See Green, supra note 86, at 369 (“Even when an association exists, researchers must
determine whether the exposure causes the disease or whether the exposure and disease are caused by
some other confounding factor.”).
94. See supra notes 90 and 91.
95. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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96

“inferior” random error. A full accounting of error also satisfies
testability, as such an accounting can only be derived from empirical
evidence. To have empirical evidence is to have testability, as testing is
the source of empirical evidence. Peer review and general acceptance
find their way into the “Daubert calculus” through judicial deference
towards the expert’s profession: “What do other experts in this field
make of this evidence?”
Nearly every scientist’s academic training includes coursework in
statistics either in name or through other coursework concerning
research methodology. What all these courses have in common is a
thorough treatment of random error. Often in the social sciences, they
include a thorough treatment of measurement error and in all the
sciences, admonishment to minimize measurement error and systematic
error to the extent possible in any given research. Unquestionably, peer
review and general acceptance, within any scientific discipline, rest
squarely on this cornerstone of science.
Our proposal is also more expedient than Daubert or Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. Daubert’s four nonexclusive factors and requirement of
“relevance” constitute an important attempt to achieve just resolutions in
litigation. Similarly, amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702’s three
criteria are “codified” positions to build upon Daubert’s standard for
admissibility. Each attempt seeks to insure that scientific evidence be
admitted when it is objective and untethered to advocacy, and excluded
when it is not. We propose an abandonment of these positions and
encourage the courts to deal with the interest squarely: to nail down
objectivity directly at its enabling source: the accounting of error.
When an expert is required to account for error, litigation is much
more manageable to the gatekeeper. So-called “Daubert hearings”
97
properly place the burden of admissibility on the litigants. Current
hearings, which often consist of confusing arguments—one side
borrowing some elements, while the other side borrowing other
elements—easily become contests of covert obfuscation (resembling
what every parent of two or more children knows all too well), entreating
the gatekeeper cum parent. Our proposal, on the other hand, anchors the
hearings squarely on three definitive criteria, all of which must be
addressed. There is nothing more or anything less for the judge to

96. Random error is inferior to systematic error by virtue of its origin. Random error derives
from sample size—smaller sample sizes yield more random error—and alternatively, larger samples
convey consistency (scientific reliability). Kaye & Freedman, supra note 52, at 171. Random error says
nothing as to whether the results are “on point”—the “fit” of the evidence to the case at bar.
Systematic error, on the other hand, derives from lack of fit between the “inequality” of the evidence
and the case at bar—ordinarily sampling that is not random. In animal studies, however, the source of
systematic error stems from the differences between the animal and the human. Id. at 160.
97. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987).
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consider. Can the expert account for the three errors? Can the opponent
adequately dispute the accounting? At a properly adversarial hearing,
such directed purpose and clear rules will assist nearly any jurist in
determining whether the proposed expert can adequately account for
error. Such a hearing would free the judge of having to rely on notions or
98
presumptions to distinguish science from mere “junk science.”
Moreover, our proposal will result in better decisions through its
reliance on objectivity. The admissibility of expert evidence historically
99
has been difficult to address properly due to its high impact on
outcomes in litigation, as well as the high potential for courts to decide
admissibility inconsistently. It is precisely because expert evidence has
such a great influence on outcomes, and rightfully so where experts can
cast clarifying light on a matter, that we ought to desire consistent
application of the rules of admissibility. By writing the rules around the
three sources of error, we achieve the interest of objectivity, we obtain
consistency in the application of the rules, and we maintain deference to
the scientific endeavor. These three outcomes, taken together, will result
100
in better decisions, and ultimately the justice that they serve.

98. See Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and
the Federal Courts 16–17 (1999).
99. See Golan, supra note 16, at 5–7.
100. “Justice” is an unfortunate victim of the inevitable clutter of language amidst life and conflict.
Contemporary usage has relegated “justice” to merely an act of the will, or less, an act of emotion,
rather than to its ancient place as the second of the four cardinal virtues. See generally Josef Pieper,
The Four Cardinal Virtues (1966). It is in the spirit of the cardinal virtues, namely, the cardinal
virtue of prudence (an even more tortured victim of contemporary usage) and of justice, that
motivates our proposal. See generally id.

